Angular: Cache-Key Ambiguity in HttpTransferCache Leading to Cross-Request Response Reuse and State Poisoning
CVE-2026-68945GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @angular/common
- Affected
- >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.2>= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.19>= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.27<= 19.2.25
- Fixed in
- 22.0.2, 21.2.19, 20.3.27
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j lists affected ranges: npm @angular/common >=22.0.0-next.0 =21.0.0-next.0 =20.0.0-next.0 =0 <=19.2.25
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.8 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-68945: 0.18% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 7.28 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. During SSR, HttpTransferCache previously generated identical key material for distinct request parameters when repeated values were present because repeated values were joined with commas: Both requests previously serialized as role=user,admin, allowing distinct HttpClient requests to produce the same transfer-cache key material. Impact In an SSR application, this cache-key ambiguity can make a later security-sensitive HttpClient request receive the response from an earlier semantically different request in the same render. For example, an attacker-influenced scalar-comma request can be cached and then replayed as the response for a trusted repeated-param authorization or data request to the same URL. As a result, Angular's server-rendered output can be based on the wrong backend response because the trusted request is not dispatched. This…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-68945 Advisory: Angular: Cache-Key Ambiguity in HttpTransferCache Leading to Cross-Request Response Reuse and State Poisoning IDs: CVE-2026-68945, GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-68945 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: @angular/common 22.0.2, 21.2.19, 20.3.27. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @angular/common: affected >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.2; >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.19; >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.27; <= 19.2.25; fixed in 22.0.2, 21.2.19, 20.3.27 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @angular/common --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @angular/common. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jhpw-976m-542j lists affected ranges: npm @angular/common >=22.0.0-next.0 =21.0.0-next.0 =20.0.0-next.0 =0 <=19.2.25) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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