Flyto2 Core: Unauthenticated flyto-verification /run: callback_url SSRF and internal runner-secret exfiltration
CVE-2026-67426GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (flyto-core 2.26.7), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI flyto-core
- Affected
- >= 2.26.6, < 2.26.7
- Fixed in
- 2.26.7
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 lists affected ranges: PyPI flyto-core >=2.26.6 <2.26.7
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 lists affected ranges: PyPI flyto-core >=2.26.6 <2.26.7 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-67426: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 31.44 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The standalone flyto-verification service exposes POST /run with no authentication, on all interfaces (0.0.0.0:8344 per the shipped Dockerfile). The request body's callbackurl is used verbatim for an outbound POST that unconditionally attaches X-Internal-Key: $FLYTORUNNERSECRET. The callbackurl bypasses the service's targetallowed allowlist (which only inspects params.targeturl) and is never passed through any SSRF guard. This yields (a) unauthenticated SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints with an attacker-controlled JSON body, and (b) exfiltration of the internal runner secret to an attacker-controlled host — allowing forged authenticated callbacks to the real engine. Root Cause - src/core/verificationservice.py:363-364 — /run has no Depends/auth dependency. - resolvecallbackurl returns the client callbackurl verbatim (:315-316). - postcallback attaches X-Internal-Key: $FLYTORUNNERSECRET whenever the env var is set (:327-335). - targetallowed only gates params.targeturl…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-67426 Advisory: Flyto2 Core: Unauthenticated flyto-verification /run: callback_url SSRF and internal runner-secret exfiltration IDs: CVE-2026-67426, GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-67426 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: flyto-core 2.26.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI flyto-core: affected >= 2.26.6, < 2.26.7; fixed in 2.26.7 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show flyto-core`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on flyto-core. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 lists affected ranges: PyPI flyto-core >=2.26.6 <2.26.7) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 (OSV record GHSA-jx74-cqjv-2c67 lists affected ranges: PyPI flyto-core >=2.26.6 <2.26.7 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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