MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-63643: 0.66% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 51.82 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Vulnerability — SSRF via ADDCALENDAR (MagicMirror² calendar) Analysis of the PoC exploit-ssrf-calendar.js. Target: calendar/nodehelper.js of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace /calendar. --- Identification | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | PoC file | exploit-ssrf-calendar.js | | Endpoint | socket.io namespace /calendar, notification ADDCALENDAR | | Precondition | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) | --- Description The ADDCALENDAR handler in calendar/nodehelper.js performs a server-side HTTP request to a URL that is fully attacker-controlled, with no SSRF protection whatsoever — unlike the project's hardened /cors endpoint. Worse, the attacker also controls: - the authentication headers the server attaches to the request (auth: { method: "bearer", pass: "..." }); - the selfSignedCert flag, which disables TLS verification of the server-side request. When the target's response is valid iCal, the server parses the events and sends them back to the attacker via…

Published by the source

18 Aug 2026, 17:26 UTC

Last modified by the source

18 Aug 2026, 17:26 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-63643

Advisory: MagicMirror: ssrf calendar .js
IDs: CVE-2026-63643, GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-63643 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: magicmirror 2.37.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm magicmirror: affected < 2.37.0; fixed in 2.37.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls magicmirror --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on magicmirror.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w6x9-28jw-hq7j lists affected ranges: npm magicmirror >=0 <2.37.0)

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