MagicMirror Socket.IO module namespaces bypass configured IP whitelist and allow unauthenticated server-side actions

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

2.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-63641: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.63 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary MagicMirror applies ipWhitelist only as Express middleware, but the Socket.IO server is attached directly to the HTTP server without equivalent IP allowlist, origin, or namespace authentication checks. In a documented common deployment where MagicMirror listens on a non-loopback interface but expects ipWhitelist to restrict access, an untrusted network client can connect directly to module Socket.IO namespaces and send arbitrary module-helper notifications. This allows unauthenticated server-side requests through default modules and can reach command execution in the default updatenotification helper when a third-party module update is pending and the attacker supplies the update command through the trusted socket configuration path. Details The affected product is the npm package/application magicmirror at version 2.36.0, tested at commit fb41d24ef522e91e802e2a623ff6afbddeb3c9d8 from https://github.com/MagicMirrorOrg/MagicMirror.git. Default committed settings bind to…

Published by the source

18 Aug 2026, 17:26 UTC

Last modified by the source

18 Aug 2026, 17:26 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w26r-fwg8-rcp3

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-63641

Advisory: MagicMirror Socket.IO module namespaces bypass configured IP whitelist and allow unauthenticated server-side actions
IDs: CVE-2026-63641, GHSA-w26r-fwg8-rcp3
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-63641 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 2.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: magicmirror 2.37.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm magicmirror: affected < 2.37.0; fixed in 2.37.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls magicmirror --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on magicmirror.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w26r-fwg8-rcp3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w26r-fwg8-rcp3 lists affected ranges: npm magicmirror >=0 <2.37.0)

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