Skip to content
Patch Next
Sign inAdd to your agent

← Actionable
Medium, CVSS 5.9amended

AnyCable: Telemetry Subsystem Contains Hardcoded Authentication Token and Transmits CLI Arguments Including Secrets

CVE-2026-63406GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Add to your agent

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/anycable/anycable

    Affected
    <= 1.6.14
    Fixed in
    1.6.15

  • Go github.com/anycable/anycable-go

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-63406: 0.30% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.82 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The telemetry subsystem embeds a hardcoded auth token ("secret") in the public source and transmits raw CLI arguments—including --secret, --jwtsecret, and --httprpcsecret values—to a third-party telemetry endpoint. Details In telemetry/config.go line 12, var authToken = "secret" is committed in the public repository and used to authenticate to https://telemetry.anycable.io. In telemetry/telemetry.go, clusterFingerprint() (line 320) calls both anycableFileConfig(c.ConfigFilePath) (line 333), which reads the full TOML config file contents, and anycableCLIArgs() (line 402), which reads os.Args[1:] verbatim—including any --secret=..., --jwtsecret=..., --httprpcsecret=... arguments. Both raw values are passed to generateDigest() (line 373), meaning the actual secret strings flow through the code path and are included in telemetry data sent to the third-party server. Since the hardcoded authToken = "secret" is public, any attacker who can perform DNS hijacking or is positioned on…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6529

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-63406

Advisory: AnyCable: Telemetry Subsystem Contains Hardcoded Authentication Token and Transmits CLI Arguments Including Secrets
IDs: CVE-2026-63406, GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-63406 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/anycable/anycable 1.6.15. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/anycable/anycable: affected <= 1.6.14; fixed in 1.6.15
- Go github.com/anycable/anycable-go: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/anycable/anycable: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/anycable/anycable-go: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/anycable/anycable, github.com/anycable/anycable-go.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm (OSV record GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/anycable/anycable >=0 <1.6.15 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6529 (OSV record GO-2026-6529 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/anycable/anycable-go >=0)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/anycable/anycable >=0 <=1.6.14)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

Loading voting…