AsyncSSH: asyncio event-loop freeze via SSH maximum packet size = 0 in SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN / OPEN_CONFIRMATION
CVE-2026-62949GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (asyncssh 2.24.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI asyncssh
- Affected
- <= 2.23.1
- Fixed in
- 2.24.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 lists affected ranges: PyPI asyncssh >=0 <=2.23.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 lists affected ranges: PyPI asyncssh >=0 <2.24.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-62949: 0.39% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 33.05 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A malicious SSH server can wedge an AsyncSSH client, and an authenticated client can wedge an AsyncSSH server, by sending a channel maximum packet size of 0 in SSHMSGCHANNELOPENCONFIRMATION (server→client) or SSHMSGCHANNELOPEN (client→server). AsyncSSH stores the peer-supplied value verbatim with no lower-bound check; the first time channel data is written, SSHChannel.flushsendbuf enters a synchronous infinite loop that cannot be interrupted by asyncio.waitfor or any timeout. The loop body has no await, so it blocks the entire asyncio event loop — for a server, one malicious authenticated channel freezes all current and future connections. RFC 4254 §5.1 leaves receiver behavior for a peer-reported "maximum packet size = 0" undefined, so the value must be rejected rather than stored. Root cause asyncssh/channel.py: With sendpktsize == 0, pktsize is 0, so buf[:0] is empty, del buf[:0] is a no-op, and sendwindow is never decremented — the while condition is permanently true, and…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-62949 Advisory: AsyncSSH: asyncio event-loop freeze via SSH maximum packet size = 0 in SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN / OPEN_CONFIRMATION IDs: CVE-2026-62949, GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-62949 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:52 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: asyncssh 2.24.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI asyncssh: affected <= 2.23.1; fixed in 2.24.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show asyncssh`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on asyncssh. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 lists affected ranges: PyPI asyncssh >=0 <=2.23.1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 (OSV record GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3 lists affected ranges: PyPI asyncssh >=0 <2.24.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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