SD JWT JS: Tampered disclosures silently dropped instead of rejected
CVE-2026-62374GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @sd-jwt/core
- Affected
- < 0.20.0
- Fixed in
- 0.20.0
npm @sd-jwt/decode
- Affected
- <= 0.19.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <=0.19.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <0.20.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-62374: 0.23% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 13.34 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary When one Disclosure in an SD-JWT presentation is tampered so its digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array, `@sd-jwt/decode` 0.19.0 does not reject the presentation. It silently drops the unmatched Disclosure and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success. The Issuer signature is untouched and valid. This is a downgrade/omission primitive. A malicious or curious holder can present a tampered Disclosure and have the relying party receive *fewer* claims than the credential carries, with no error surfaced. Where the relying party does not enforce key binding, an in-transit (on-path) attacker can achieve the same by mangling one Disclosure's bytes; where key binding is enforced, on-path tampering instead breaks the holder's KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding (so it is rejected), and the downgrade is then exercisable by the key-bound holder — confirmed end-to-end with KB required. Two distinct tampering inputs converge on the same silent-drop…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-62374 Advisory: SD JWT JS: Tampered disclosures silently dropped instead of rejected IDs: CVE-2026-62374, GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-62374 (revision 2, source checked 3 Nov 2026, 06:00 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: @sd-jwt/core 0.20.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @sd-jwt/core: affected < 0.20.0; fixed in 0.20.0 - npm @sd-jwt/decode: affected <= 0.19.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @sd-jwt/core --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. - `npm ls @sd-jwt/decode --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @sd-jwt/core, @sd-jwt/decode. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <=0.19.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 (OSV record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <0.20.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…