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High, CVSS 7.1amended

SD JWT JS: Tampered disclosures silently dropped instead of rejected

CVE-2026-62374GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • npm @sd-jwt/core

    Affected
    < 0.20.0
    Fixed in
    0.20.0
  • npm @sd-jwt/decode

    Affected
    <= 0.19.0
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-62374: 0.23% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 13.34 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary When one Disclosure in an SD-JWT presentation is tampered so its digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array, `@sd-jwt/decode` 0.19.0 does not reject the presentation. It silently drops the unmatched Disclosure and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success. The Issuer signature is untouched and valid. This is a downgrade/omission primitive. A malicious or curious holder can present a tampered Disclosure and have the relying party receive *fewer* claims than the credential carries, with no error surfaced. Where the relying party does not enforce key binding, an in-transit (on-path) attacker can achieve the same by mangling one Disclosure's bytes; where key binding is enforced, on-path tampering instead breaks the holder's KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding (so it is rejected), and the downgrade is then exercisable by the key-bound holder — confirmed end-to-end with KB required. Two distinct tampering inputs converge on the same silent-drop…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-62374

Advisory: SD JWT JS: Tampered disclosures silently dropped instead of rejected
IDs: CVE-2026-62374, GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-62374 (revision 2, source checked 3 Nov 2026, 06:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: @sd-jwt/core 0.20.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @sd-jwt/core: affected < 0.20.0; fixed in 0.20.0
- npm @sd-jwt/decode: affected <= 0.19.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @sd-jwt/core --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.
- `npm ls @sd-jwt/decode --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @sd-jwt/core, @sd-jwt/decode.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <=0.19.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 (OSV record GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 lists affected ranges: npm @sd-jwt/decode >=0 =0 <0.20.0 (fixed))

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