praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)
CVE-2026-62331GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor 0.9.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor
- Affected
- < 0.9.1
- Fixed in
- 0.9.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor >=0 <=0.9.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor >=0 <0.9.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-62331: 0.78% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 55.90 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk- `, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory. The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`. Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-62331 Advisory: praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection) IDs: CVE-2026-62331, GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-62331 (revision 2, source checked 4 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.2) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor 0.9.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor: affected < 0.9.1; fixed in 0.9.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor >=0 <=0.9.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 (OSV record GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor >=0 <0.9.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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