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High, CVSS 8.1amended

zot: Bearer authentication maps DELETE to push scope, allowing unauthorized deletion

CVE-2026-61833GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2

    Affected
    < 2.1.18
    Fixed in
    2.1.18

  • Go zotregistry.dev/zot

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-61833: 0.81% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 56.99 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A bearer token with only pull and push scopes can successfully delete manifests and blobs from a zot registry. The bearer authentication handler maps all non-GET/HEAD HTTP methods, including DELETE, to the "push" action, and the DistSpecAuthzHandler middleware is bypassed entirely for bearer-authenticated requests. This allows any client holding a push-only bearer token to delete arbitrary manifests and blobs within the token's repository scope, in violation of the Docker Distribution Token Authentication Specification. Details The vulnerability exists in two interacting components: 1. Action Mapping Collapse (pkg/api/authn.go:571–586) The bearer authentication handler maps HTTP methods to token scope actions using a binary check: This collapses DELETE, PUT, PATCH, and POST into a single "push" action. The "delete" action is never assigned. 2. Authorization Bypass for Bearer Auth (pkg/api/authz.go:270–275, 318–323) When a request is authenticated via bearer token, the…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6527

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-61833

Advisory: zot: Bearer authentication maps DELETE to push scope, allowing unauthorized deletion
IDs: CVE-2026-61833, GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-61833 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: zotregistry.dev/zot/v2 2.1.18. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2: affected < 2.1.18; fixed in 2.1.18
- Go zotregistry.dev/zot: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go zotregistry.dev/zot: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zotregistry.dev/zot/v2, zotregistry.dev/zot.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25 (OSV record GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25 lists affected ranges: Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2 >=0 <2.1.18 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6527 (OSV record GO-2026-6527 lists affected ranges: Go zotregistry.dev/zot >=0; Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2 >=0 <2.1.18 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qg67-7m6v-qg25 lists affected ranges: Go zotregistry.dev/zot/v2 >=0 <2.1.18)

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