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High, CVSS 8.1amended

nginx ignition has Unauthenticated Admin Account Creation via Onboarding Race Condition

CVE-2026-61628GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-61628: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.77 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary POST /api/users/onboarding/finish is registered as anonymous (unauthenticated) and creates a user with full ReadWrite admin permissions. Because the handler uses a check-then-act (TOCTOU) pattern between the "onboarding already completed?" check and the user-creation write, with no atomic guard, a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach an instance in its pre-onboarding state can create an administrator account for themselves — and concurrent requests can create multiple admin accounts in a single race. Affected component - Endpoint: POST /api/users/onboarding/finish - Route registration: api/user/routes.go:49 → authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodPost, "/api/users/onboarding/finish") - Handler: api/user/onboardingfinishhandler.go Technical details The route is explicitly allowed without authentication: The handler reads the onboarding state, returns 403 if already finished, and otherwise creates a user with every permission set to ReadWrite: The gap between (1)…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6540

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-61628

Advisory: nginx ignition has Unauthenticated Admin Account Creation via Onboarding Race Condition
IDs: CVE-2026-61628, GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-61628 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition: affected < 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab; fixed in 0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5 (OSV record GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition >=0 <0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6540 (OSV record GO-2026-6540 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition >=0)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pxcx-fv34-x9p5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition >=0 <0.0.0-20260621194639-0586b4e55ab)

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