Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-58442: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 36.94 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Gitea's repository migration URL validation can be bypassed when a migration hostname resolves to multiple IP addresses. The validation logic accepts the destination if any resolved IP is allowed, even if another resolved IP is loopback, private, or otherwise blocked. The later git clone operation resolves the hostname again outside of that validation decision, so it can connect to the internal address. An authenticated low-privilege user who can create repository migrations can use an attacker-controlled DNS name to make Gitea connect to internal-only Git services and import their contents into a repository controlled by the attacker. Details The issue is in services/migrations/migrate.go, in the migration allow/block-list check. Current logic computes whether any resolved IP is allowed: Then, when an allow-list is active, the host is accepted if the hostname matches or ipAllowed is true: This means a hostname resolving to both: - an allowed public IP, e.g. 1.2.3.4 - a…

Published by the source

21 Jul 2026, 20:37 UTC

Last modified by the source

21 Jul 2026, 20:37 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:27 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-h2x6-g7q6-344v

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-58442

Advisory: Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass
IDs: CVE-2026-58442, GHSA-h2x6-g7q6-344v
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-58442 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:27 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go code.gitea.io/gitea: affected < 1.27.0; fixed in 1.27.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go code.gitea.io/gitea: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on code.gitea.io/gitea.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h2x6-g7q6-344v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h2x6-g7q6-344v lists affected ranges: Go code.gitea.io/gitea >=0 <1.27.0)

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