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High, CVSS 8.8amended

rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs

CVE-2026-58273GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (rucio 41.0.0rc1, 38.6.0, 35.9.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • PyPI rucio

    Affected
    >= 1.16.1, < 35.9.0>= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.0>= 39.0.0rc1, < 41.0.0rc1
    Fixed in
    41.0.0rc1, 35.9.0, 38.6.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The `/credentials/signurl` endpoint decides authorization from the client-supplied `X-Rucio-Account` HTTP header instead of the authenticated token's account. Any client holding any valid auth token (even a low-privilege account they legitimately own) can send `X-Rucio-Account: root` to pass the root-only permission check and have the Rucio server mint a presigned read / write / delete URL for an arbitrary object, signed with the RSE's stored S3 / GCS / Swift credentials.

Details `SignURL.get()` takes the authorization principal from a request header and never uses the token-authenticated identity: ```python

lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/credentials.py account = request.headers.get('X-Rucio-Account', default=None)

L165 (attacker-controlled) ... result = get_signed_url(account, rse=rse, service=service,

L194 operation=operation, url=url, lifetime=lifetime, vo=vo) ``` The gateway then uses that header value as the `issuer` for the permission check:…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-58273

Advisory: rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs
IDs: CVE-2026-58273, GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-58273 (revision 2, source checked 29 Oct 2026, 06:25 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: rucio 41.0.0rc1, 38.6.0, 35.9.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI rucio: affected >= 1.16.1, < 35.9.0; >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.0; >= 39.0.0rc1, < 41.0.0rc1; fixed in 41.0.0rc1, 35.9.0, 38.6.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show rucio`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on rucio.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg lists affected ranges: PyPI rucio >=1.16.1 =36.0.0rc1 =39.0.0rc1 <41.0.0rc1)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg (OSV record GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg lists affected ranges: PyPI rucio >=1.16.1 =36.0.0rc1 =39.0.0rc1 <41.0.0rc1 (fixed))

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