Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)
CVE-2026-58272GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@sync-in/server 2.4.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @sync-in/server
- Affected
- <= 2.4.0
- Fixed in
- 2.4.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 lists affected ranges: npm @sync-in/server >=0 <=2.4.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 lists affected ranges: npm @sync-in/server >=0 <2.4.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-58272: 0.39% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 33.59 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword(): async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTHSCOPE): Promise<UserModel { let user: UserModel try { user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false) } catch (e) { ... } if (!user) { this.logger.warn(...) return null // <-- comparePassword() is never reached here } return await this.usersManager.logUser(user, password, ip, scope) } comparePassword() (backend/src/common/functions.ts) already contains a dummy-hash branch that was clearly added to defend against exactly this class of attack: export async function comparePassword(password: string, hash?: string | null): Promise<boolean { if (!hash) { // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMYPASSWORDHASH) return false } return await…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-58272 Advisory: Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory) IDs: CVE-2026-58272, GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-58272 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @sync-in/server 2.4.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @sync-in/server: affected <= 2.4.0; fixed in 2.4.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @sync-in/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @sync-in/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 lists affected ranges: npm @sync-in/server >=0 <=2.4.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 (OSV record GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47 lists affected ranges: npm @sync-in/server >=0 <2.4.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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