Hono added timing comparison hardening in basicAuth and bearerAuth

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

3.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-56764: 0.30% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.41 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe. The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences. The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method. Details The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function. In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match. Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis. The implementation has been updated to: - Avoid early termination during comparison - Use a constant-time-style comparison method Impact This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments. It may only…

Published by the source

19 Feb 2026, 20:15 UTC

Last modified by the source

10 Sep 2026, 03:50 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-56764

Advisory: Hono added timing comparison hardening in basicAuth and bearerAuth
IDs: CVE-2026-56764, GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-56764 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: hono 4.11.10. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm hono: affected < 4.11.10; fixed in 4.11.10

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls hono --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on hono.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf (OSV record GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf lists affected ranges: npm hono >=0 <4.11.10 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf lists affected ranges: npm hono >=0 <4.11.10)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.