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High, CVSS 8.8amended

Crawl4AI: LLM credential exfiltration in Docker server via request base_url and env: token resolution

CVE-2026-56259GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (crawl4ai 0.8.8), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • PyPI crawl4ai

    Affected
    <= 0.8.7
    Fixed in
    0.8.8

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.8 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-56259: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.67 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The Docker API server let a request control where LLM calls were sent and which environment variable an LLM token resolved from. Both could be abused to exfiltrate server-held secrets. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default. Vector 1 - attacker baseurl /md, /llm, and /llm/job accepted a baseurl in the request and used it as the LLM endpoint while still attaching the server's configured provider API key. An attacker set baseurl to a server they control and received the provider key (and any provider keys the server holds) in the inbound request. Vector 2 - arbitrary environment variable read via env: LLMConfig(apitoken="env:NAME") resolved NAME from the server environment with os.getenv. Because request bodies were deserialized into LLMConfig (via a crawler config / extraction strategy), an attacker could set apitoken="env:SECRETKEY" (or env:REDISPASSWORD, etc.) and, paired with an attacker baseurl, exfiltrate that secret. Reading the server's SECRETKEY enables forging…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-56259

Advisory: Crawl4AI: LLM credential exfiltration in Docker server via request base_url and env: token resolution
IDs: CVE-2026-56259, GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-56259 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:45 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: crawl4ai 0.8.8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI crawl4ai: affected <= 0.8.7; fixed in 0.8.8

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show crawl4ai`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on crawl4ai.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq (OSV record GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq lists affected ranges: PyPI crawl4ai >=0 <0.8.8 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq lists affected ranges: PyPI crawl4ai >=0 <=0.8.7)

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