Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
CVE-2026-55987GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3 lists affected ranges: Go code.gitea.io/gitea >=0 <1.27.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-55987: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Description Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (IsActive=false) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without offlineaccess). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets IsActive=true and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. (ProhibitLogin, the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.) No special privileges…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-55987 Advisory: Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) IDs: CVE-2026-55987, GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-55987 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:27 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go code.gitea.io/gitea: affected < 1.27.0; fixed in 1.27.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go code.gitea.io/gitea: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on code.gitea.io/gitea. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3 lists affected ranges: Go code.gitea.io/gitea >=0 <1.27.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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