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High, CVSS 8.6amended

mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist

CVE-2026-55580GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell 0.6.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.6 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-55580: 0.20% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 9.45 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

mcp-shell at commit 17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433 has two issues that together mean neither the default deploy path nor the recommended "secure mode" delivers the restriction they're marketed as providing. Filing these together because the two failure modes bracket the full intended audience — the from-source path gets users who skip security config entirely, the Docker path gets users who follow the security.yaml example and believe they're protected. --- The first issue is in config.go, line 49: Security is opt-in. The bare binary ships with Enabled: false, and security.go lines 26–29 make the consequence explicit: main.go lines 35–39 confirm the deployment condition: The README's from-source install path (lines 22–26) runs git clone ... && make install && mcp-shell with no environment variable and no config file. The MCP client config example block (lines 78–85) passes only MCPSHELLLOGLEVEL — no MCPSHELLSECCONFIGFILE. Every operator who follows either documented path…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 4 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m

  2. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6292

  4. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-55580

Advisory: mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist
IDs: CVE-2026-55580, GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-55580 (revision 4, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:28 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell 0.6.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell: affected < 0.6.0; fixed in 0.6.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m (OSV record GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell >=0 <0.6.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6292 (OSV record GO-2026-6292 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell >=0 <0.6.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell >=0 <0.6.0)

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