PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] praisonai serve agents --api-key is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (POST /agents, POST /agents/{agent_name}) run unauthenticated

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-55538: 0.45% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 39.03 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary praisonai serve agents exposes HTTP routes that invoke registered agents. The CLI advertises --api-key with help text "API key for authentication", parses it, and forwards it into ServeHandler. But createagentsapp() never reads config["apikey"] again and installs no auth dependency or middleware on its direct routes. The configured key is a no-op flag. As a result, an unauthenticated network caller can invoke exposed agents (POST /agents and POST /agents/{agentname}) even when the operator passed --api-key. Requests with no credentials, a wrong Authorization: Bearer, a wrong X-API-Key, or an empty bearer all reach agent.start(). The failure is made sharper by the fact that a working auth dependency already exists in the same module — praisonai.api.agentinvoke.verifytoken guards every /api/v1/... route with Depends(verifytoken) and is mounted into the very same app. The direct n8n-compat routes simply do not use it. Technical Detail Source-to-sink trace 1. CLI advertises and…

Published by the source

25 Aug 2026, 14:56 UTC

Last modified by the source

25 Aug 2026, 14:57 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-r7v3-x45f-g7hp

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-55538

Advisory: PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unauthenticated
IDs: CVE-2026-55538, GHSA-r7v3-x45f-g7hp
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-55538 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: praisonai 4.6.58. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI praisonai: affected < 4.6.58; fixed in 4.6.58

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show praisonai`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on praisonai.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7v3-x45f-g7hp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r7v3-x45f-g7hp lists affected ranges: PyPI praisonai >=0 <4.6.58)

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