PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-55533: 0.49% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 41.91 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The PraisonAI Recipe HTTP server silently allows unauthenticated requests when auth is configured as api-key or jwt but the corresponding secret is missing. This creates an authentication fail-open condition. An operator can start the Recipe server with authentication enabled, including on a non-localhost interface, but the server still accepts unauthenticated requests if no API key or JWT secret is provided. The issue is especially risky because the CLI safety check for non-localhost binding only verifies that auth != "none". It does not verify that an actual API key or JWT secret exists. Details The Recipe server documents the following authentication modes: - none - api-key - jwt Relevant source locations: - src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py - src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py In createauthmiddleware(), the API key middleware resolves the expected key as: This means auth: api-key does not enforce authentication if apikey / PRAISONAIAPIKEY is missing. The…

Published by the source

25 Aug 2026, 15:15 UTC

Last modified by the source

25 Aug 2026, 15:15 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-55533

Advisory: PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret
IDs: CVE-2026-55533, GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-55533 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: praisonai 4.6.58. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI praisonai: affected < 4.6.58; fixed in 4.6.58

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show praisonai`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on praisonai.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv lists affected ranges: PyPI praisonai >=0 <4.6.58)

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