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High, CVSS 7.6amended

CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in the /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard

CVE-2026-55177GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@tak-ps/cloudtak 13.10.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
7.6 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-55177: 0.38% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 32.04 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK /api/esri routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard Summary Every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/ routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.isauth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port), and other…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-55177

Advisory: CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in the /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard
IDs: CVE-2026-55177, GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-55177 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:57 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @tak-ps/cloudtak 13.10.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @tak-ps/cloudtak: affected < 13.10.0; fixed in 13.10.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @tak-ps/cloudtak --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @tak-ps/cloudtak.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc (OSV record GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.10.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.10.0)

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