CoreWCF: SAML SubjectConfirmation methods and holder-of-key proof keys are not enforced
CVE-2026-54781GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (corewcf.primitives 1.9.1, 1.8.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
NuGet corewcf.primitives
- Affected
- < 1.8.1>= 1.9.0, < 1.9.1
- Fixed in
- 1.8.1, 1.9.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4 lists affected ranges: NuGet corewcf.primitives >=0 =1.9.0 <1.9.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-54781: 0.25% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 16.16 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact The relying application is given a ClaimsPrincipal for a subject whose authority over the assertion the sender never proved. There are two distinct exploit shapes: - Holder-of-key downgrade. An attacker who obtains a holder-of-key SAML assertion that was issued without KeyInfo (issuer bug, custom STS shape, or assertion captured from an interaction where KeyInfo was elided) can present it to the service and be authenticated as the assertion’s subject without producing the proof key the assertion’s confirmation method would normally require. The service’s reliance on holder-of-key for sensitive actions is bypassed. - Custom-method bypass. An attacker who can obtain or arrange the issuance of a SAML assertion bearing a non-standard confirmation method URI (a permissive STS that accepts arbitrary method strings, an experimental custom IDP, or an attacker-side construction that the issuer signs without validating the method field) can present the assertion and be authenticated.…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54781 Advisory: CoreWCF: SAML SubjectConfirmation methods and holder-of-key proof keys are not enforced IDs: CVE-2026-54781, GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54781 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:04 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.4) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: corewcf.primitives 1.9.1, 1.8.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - NuGet corewcf.primitives: affected < 1.8.1; >= 1.9.0, < 1.9.1; fixed in 1.8.1, 1.9.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - NuGet corewcf.primitives: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on corewcf.primitives. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4 lists affected ranges: NuGet corewcf.primitives >=0 =1.9.0 <1.9.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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