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Critical, CVSS 9.6amended

vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount enables cluster-wide SA token theft via TokenRequest API

CVE-2026-54725GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook 1.23.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
9.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-54725: 0.45% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 39.05 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The vault-secrets-webhook reads the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with vault:, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide, and the vault-serviceaccount annotation controls which ServiceAccount's JWT is fetched and sent to that address. An attacker who can create ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can cause the webhook process to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs. Details parseVaultConfig() at pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107 reads VaultAddrAnnotation unconditionally into vaultConfig.Addr: No URL scheme validation, no hostname allowlist, no RFC-1918…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6160

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54725

Advisory: vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount enables cluster-wide SA token theft via TokenRequest API
IDs: CVE-2026-54725, GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54725 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:28 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook 1.23.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook: affected <= 1.22.2; fixed in 1.23.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm (OSV record GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook >=0 <1.23.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6160 (OSV record GO-2026-6160 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook >=0 <1.23.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook >=0 <=1.22.2)

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