OAuth: Cross-origin token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-54605: 0.19% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 8.55 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Cross-origin OAuth token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata Summary When an application uses OAuth::Consumer to request OAuth 1.0 request tokens or access tokens, the token request helper follows 300..399 redirects returned by the OAuth server. In affected versions, OAuth::Consumer#tokenrequest parses the raw Location header, follows the redirect recursively, and can mutate the consumer's configured site when the redirect points to a different host with the same path. The result is a cross-origin signed-request disclosure primitive: if an OAuth server token endpoint returns a redirect whose target an attacker controls, the client can re-sign the token request and send OAuth 1.0 request metadata, including the OAuth signature, nonce, timestamp, consumer key, and any request parameters included in the signature base string, to the attacker-controlled host. The same behavior can also be used as an SSRF or confused-deputy primitive because the application server follows…

Published by the source

28 Jul 2026, 16:27 UTC

Last modified by the source

28 Jul 2026, 16:35 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54605

Advisory: OAuth: Cross-origin token-request redirects can expose signed request metadata
IDs: CVE-2026-54605, GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54605 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: oauth 1.1.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- RubyGems oauth: affected >= 0.5.5, <= 1.1.5; fixed in 1.1.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- RubyGems oauth: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on oauth.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh (OSV record GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh lists affected ranges: RubyGems oauth >=0.5.5 <1.1.6 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-prq8-7wvh-44qh lists affected ranges: RubyGems oauth >=0.5.5 <=1.1.5)

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