TAK-PS-Stats Web UI: Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK basemap import (PUT /api/basemap) — no IP-classification guard
CVE-2026-54546GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@tak-ps/cloudtak 13.22.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @tak-ps/cloudtak
- Affected
- < 13.22.1
- Fixed in
- 13.22.1
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.22.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.22.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 5.0 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-54546: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 31.21 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary PUT /api/basemap (the basemap import endpoint) fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side with no SSRF protection whatsoever. Any authenticated user can submit a JSON body { "type": "...", "url": "<attacker url" }; the server calls fetch(url) against that URL and then reflects the response body (name, attribution, tiles[0], zoom levels) back to the caller in the OptionalTileJSON response. Because there is no IP-address classification, internal-only services are reachable: cloud metadata (http://169.254.169.254/...), loopback (http://127.0.0.1/...), RFC1918 ranges, and CGNAT. The response body flows back to the attacker, making this a full-read SSRF (not blind): the attacker reads the internal HTTP response verbatim. This enables theft of cloud instance credentials, internal service enumeration, and reading of internal-only HTTP endpoints from the network position of the CloudTAK API server. The only URL check in the basemap protocol layer (BasemapProtocol.isValidURL,…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54546 Advisory: TAK-PS-Stats Web UI: Authenticated full-read SSRF in CloudTAK basemap import (PUT /api/basemap) — no IP-classification guard IDs: CVE-2026-54546, GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54546 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @tak-ps/cloudtak 13.22.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @tak-ps/cloudtak: affected < 13.22.1; fixed in 13.22.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @tak-ps/cloudtak --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @tak-ps/cloudtak. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v (OSV record GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.22.1 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vqrw-qphh-p34v lists affected ranges: npm @tak-ps/cloudtak >=0 <13.22.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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