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High, CVSS 8.8amended

@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in HttpTransferCache Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning

CVE-2026-54266GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • npm @angular/common

    Affected
    >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.1>= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.17>= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.25<= 19.2.25
    Fixed in
    20.3.25, 22.0.1, 21.2.17

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.8 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-54266: 0.13% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 2.37 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in TransferState using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters). The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions. An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., q=aaCAZMMM for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., /api/user/profile). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54266

Advisory: @angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning
IDs: CVE-2026-54266, GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54266 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:56 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: @angular/common 22.0.1, 21.2.17, 20.3.25. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @angular/common: affected >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.1; >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.17; >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.25; <= 19.2.25; fixed in 20.3.25, 22.0.1, 21.2.17

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @angular/common --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @angular/common.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v (OSV record GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v lists affected ranges: npm @angular/common >=22.0.0-next.0 =21.0.0-next.0 =20.0.0-next.0 =0 <=19.2.25)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v lists affected ranges: npm @angular/common >=22.0.0-next.0 =21.0.0-next.0 =20.0.0-next.0 =0 <=19.2.25)

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