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High, CVSS 7.2

File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix

CVE-2026-54097GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

    Affected
    <= 2.63.5
    Fixed in
    2.63.6

  • Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

    Affected
    <= 1.11.0
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
7.2 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-54097: 0.45% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 39.14 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped. Details resourceDeleteHandler in http/resource.go cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling: file.Path here is the logical path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. /a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend: Why the design contradicts this behavior. share.Link carries a UserID field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. shareDeleteHandler explicitly enforces link.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-54097

Advisory: File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix
IDs: CVE-2026-54097, GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-54097 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:27 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 2.63.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2: affected <= 2.63.5; fixed in 2.63.6
- Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser: affected <= 1.11.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser >=0 =0 <=2.63.5)

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