Caddy: Windows file_server path authorization bypass via encoded backslash
CVE-2026-52844GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
- Affected
- < 2.11.4
- Fixed in
- 2.11.4
Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy
- Affected
- <= 1.0.5
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.0.5
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-52844: 0.62% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 49.73 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary On Windows, Caddy path matchers treat /private\secret.txt as outside /private/, but fileserver later resolves the same request path as private\secret.txt on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can request /private%5csecret.txt and bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting /private/. Details The mismatch is between two Caddy code paths: - MatchPath.MatchWithError() compares r.URL.Path using URL path semantics and does not normalize \ to /: modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go:429, :436, :490, :532. - If the route matcher misses, Caddy skips that route: modules/caddyhttp/routes.go:271. - fileserver then maps the same request path to a filesystem path with SanitizedPathJoin(root, r.URL.Path): modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:294, modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go:257, :263. - On Windows, Go filesystem path handling treats \ as a separator, so the default filesystem opens the file under the protected directory: internal/filesystems/os.go:18. This is related to, but…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-52844 Advisory: Caddy: Windows `file_server` path authorization bypass via encoded backslash IDs: CVE-2026-52844, GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-52844 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:25 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 2.11.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2: affected < 2.11.4; fixed in 2.11.4 - Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy: affected <= 1.0.5 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2, github.com/caddyserver/caddy. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.0.5) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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