Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync
CVE-2026-52841GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments
- Affected
- <= 1.5.2
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr lists affected ranges: Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments >=0 <=1.5.2
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr lists affected ranges: Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments >=0 <=1.5.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-52841: 0.21% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 10.71 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Google::oauth at application/controllers/Google.php:278 stores its URL-supplied providerid in the session, and oauthcallback saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Preconditions - Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in. - The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at application/config/google.php - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all. - Default deployment per the project's own docker-compose.yml; no non-default flags required. Details The same controller already carries the right gate on every other sync-management entry. selectgooglecalendar at…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-52841 Advisory: Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync IDs: CVE-2026-52841, GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-52841 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:50 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Low (CVSS 3.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments: affected <= 1.5.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on alextselegidis/easyappointments. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr (OSV record GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr lists affected ranges: Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments >=0 <=1.5.2) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr lists affected ranges: Packagist alextselegidis/easyappointments >=0 <=1.5.2) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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