Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-52738: 0.51% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 43.30 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1. 2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network. Summary The finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed MAXMONEY, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer. Because the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch. Details The finalized state writer at zebra-state/src/service/finalizedstate/zebradb/transparent.rs iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a…

Published by the source

2 Jul 2026, 19:44 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Jul 2026, 19:44 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-52738

Advisory: Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks
IDs: CVE-2026-52738, GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-52738 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: zebra-state 7.0.0; zebrad 4.5.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io zebra-state: affected <= 6.0.0; fixed in 7.0.0
- crates.io zebrad: affected <= 4.4.1; fixed in 4.5.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io zebra-state: check the installed version with your package manager.
- crates.io zebrad: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zebra-state, zebrad.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w lists affected ranges: crates.io zebra-state >=0 =0 <=4.4.1)

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