zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-52733: 0.44% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.93 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1. 2. Your node participates in a network where chain forks occur (mainnet, testnet, or any network with multiple miners). All default configurations are affected. The corruption persists across restarts because it is written to RocksDB. Summary When poptip removes the tip block during a chain fork, stale Sapling and Orchard note commitment subtree root data is retained in the in-memory non-finalized state. When the chain subsequently finalizes, this stale data is written to the persistent RocksDB state. The corrupted subtree root history affects zgetsubtreesbyindex (used by lightwalletd for wallet synchronization) and could affect future chain verification that depends on correct subtree roots. Details The non-finalized state provides two methods for removing blocks: poproot (removes the oldest block during finalization) and poptip (removes the newest block during a fork revert). poproot correctly cleans…

Published by the source

2 Jul 2026, 20:11 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Jul 2026, 20:11 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-52733

Advisory: zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip
IDs: CVE-2026-52733, GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-52733 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: zebra-state 7.0.0; zebrad 4.5.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io zebra-state: affected <= 6.0.0; fixed in 7.0.0
- crates.io zebrad: affected <= 4.4.1; fixed in 4.5.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io zebra-state: check the installed version with your package manager.
- crates.io zebrad: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zebra-state, zebrad.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h lists affected ranges: crates.io zebra-state >=0 =0 <=4.4.1)

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