Sigstore Timestamp Authority has OOM due to unbounded metric label cardinality
CVE-2026-49835GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority
- Affected
- <= 1.2.9
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2
- Affected
- <= 2.0.6
- Fixed in
- 2.1.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.2.9
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-49835: 0.74% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 54.80 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger unbounded memory growth on the timestamp authority server. This vulnerability exists because the global wrapMetrics middleware records the raw HTTP request path (r.URL.Path) and raw HTTP request method (r.Method) as Prometheus labels for latency and request count metric vectors. Since this middleware runs before standard routing occurs, it executes for all incoming requests, including those for unmatched paths (yielding 404 responses) or arbitrary request methods. The Prometheus library registers a new, permanent time-series entry for every distinct label combination. An attacker can continuously issue requests containing random paths (e.g., /api/v1/timestamp/<uuid) or random HTTP methods to exhaust system memory. Patches This issue has been patched by limiting the metric label values to a strict allowlist of expected paths (/ping, /api/v1/timestamp, /api/v1/timestamp/certchain) and expected HTTP methods (GET, POST, HEAD,…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-49835 Advisory: Sigstore Timestamp Authority has OOM due to unbounded metric label cardinality IDs: CVE-2026-49835, GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-49835 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2 2.1.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority: affected <= 1.2.9 - Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2: affected <= 2.0.6; fixed in 2.1.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority, github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-9c54-x2g4-v92j lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.2.9) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…