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Medium, CVSS 6.5amended

sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

CVE-2026-48816GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@sigstore/verify 3.1.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-48816: 0.14% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 3.72 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

sigstore-js derives a transparency-log timestamp from tlogEntries[].integratedTime and uses it to validate certificate validity windows and satisfy timestampThreshold. For bundle v0.2, a tlog entry can be inclusionProof-only (no signed inclusionPromise/set), and the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind integratedTime. As a result, an attacker who can supply an untrusted bundle can influence time-based verification decisions by choosing integratedTime. impact If a consumer accepts attacker-provided bundle v0.2 inputs and relies on tlog-derived timestamps for certificate validity checks, verification can be influenced by an unauthenticated timestamp value. This is a trust gap: integratedTime is treated as a trusted observer timestamp under inclusionProof-only mode even though only the signed inclusionPromise/set path binds it. affected code - packages/verify/src/bundle/index.ts (adds a transparency-log timestamp whenever integratedTime != 0) -…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48816

Advisory: sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
IDs: CVE-2026-48816, GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48816 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:56 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @sigstore/verify 3.1.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @sigstore/verify: affected >= 3.1.0, <= 3.1.0; fixed in 3.1.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @sigstore/verify --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @sigstore/verify.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 (OSV record GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 lists affected ranges: npm @sigstore/verify >=3.1.0 <3.1.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 lists affected ranges: npm @sigstore/verify >=3.1.0 <=3.1.0)

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