Backpropagate: backprop ui --auth and backprop ui --share do not enforce authentication

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

9.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-48797: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 25.55 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary In `backpropagate >= 1.1.0`, the optional Reflex web UI (`pip install backpropagate[ui]`, launched via `backprop ui`) exposes a training control plane: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: - `--auth user:pass` — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." - `--share` — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires `--auth`." When `--auth user:pass` is passed, the CLI prints `Auth: enabled (user: )` to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports `BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass` to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (`backpropagate/ui_app/`) never reads `BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH`.** No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port…

Published by the source

26 Jun 2026, 20:34 UTC

Last modified by the source

27 Oct 2026, 16:30 UTC

Source last checked

28 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC

1. Revision 6 · amended · 28 Oct 2026

   Amended from osv record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

2. Revision 5 · amended · 27 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

3. Revision 4 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

4. Revision 3 · amended · 24 Oct 2026

   Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

5. Revision 2 · amended · 24 Oct 2026

   Amended from osv record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

6. Revision 1 · created · 23 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48797

Advisory: Backpropagate: backprop ui --auth and backprop ui --share do not enforce authentication
IDs: CVE-2026-48797, GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48797 (revision 6, source checked 28 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @mcptoolshop/backpropagate 1.2.0; backpropagate 1.2.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @mcptoolshop/backpropagate: affected >= 1.1.0, < 1.2.0; fixed in 1.2.0
- PyPI backpropagate: affected >= 1.1.0, < 1.2.0; fixed in 1.2.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @mcptoolshop/backpropagate --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.
- `python -m pip show backpropagate`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @mcptoolshop/backpropagate, backpropagate.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h lists affected ranges: PyPI backpropagate >=1.1.0 =1.1.0 <1.2.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h (OSV record GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h lists affected ranges: PyPI backpropagate >=1.1.0 =1.1.0 <1.2.0 (fixed))

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