MessagePack-CSharp: ASP.NET Core MessagePackInputFormatter defaults to TrustedData for HTTP request bodies
CVE-2026-48509GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (messagepack 3.1.7, 2.5.301), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
NuGet messagepack
- Affected
- < 2.5.301>= 3.0, < 3.1.7
- Fixed in
- 2.5.301, 3.1.7
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q lists affected ranges: NuGet messagepack >=0 =3.0 <3.1.7
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-48509: 0.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.97 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The parameterless MessagePackInputFormatter() constructor uses default serializer options, which resolve to MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard with MessagePackSecurity.TrustedData. The formatter is designed for ASP.NET Core MVC request bodies, which commonly cross an HTTP trust boundary. This insecure default can expose applications to denial-of-service attacks that MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData is intended to mitigate, such as hash-collision attacks against dictionary-like model properties. Impact Applications are affected when they register new MessagePackInputFormatter() without explicitly passing serializer options configured for untrusted data. An unauthenticated or otherwise untrusted HTTP client can send MessagePack request bodies that are deserialized using the trusted-data posture. For models containing hash-based collections, this can enable algorithmic complexity attacks using colliding keys. The default constructor makes the unsafe posture easy to use at…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48509 Advisory: MessagePack-CSharp: ASP.NET Core MessagePackInputFormatter defaults to TrustedData for HTTP request bodies IDs: CVE-2026-48509, GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48509 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:04 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: messagepack 3.1.7, 2.5.301. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - NuGet messagepack: affected < 2.5.301; >= 3.0, < 3.1.7; fixed in 2.5.301, 3.1.7 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - NuGet messagepack: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on messagepack. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2f33-pr97-265q lists affected ranges: NuGet messagepack >=0 =3.0 <3.1.7) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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