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High, CVSS 8.5amended

Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata

CVE-2026-48153GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@budibase/server 3.39.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-48153: 0.18% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 6.97 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary fetchToken in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the blacklist.isBlacklisted check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at http://169.254.169.254/... or http://127.0.0.1:5984/; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. Details packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65 defines fetchToken. Near the end: config.url is whatever the builder stored. fetchConfig has redirect: "follow" (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9 accepts any string: The controller passes the URL into fetchToken through crud.ts. The /api/oauth2/validate endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on builderRoutes, takes the URL from the…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48153

Advisory: Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata
IDs: CVE-2026-48153, GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48153 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:56 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @budibase/server 3.39.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @budibase/server: affected < 3.39.0; fixed in 3.39.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq (OSV record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0)

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