Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata
CVE-2026-48153GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@budibase/server 3.39.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- < 3.39.0
- Fixed in
- 3.39.0
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-48153: 0.18% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 6.97 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary fetchToken in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the blacklist.isBlacklisted check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at http://169.254.169.254/... or http://127.0.0.1:5984/; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. Details packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65 defines fetchToken. Near the end: config.url is whatever the builder stored. fetchConfig has redirect: "follow" (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9 accepts any string: The controller passes the URL into fetchToken through crud.ts. The /api/oauth2/validate endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on builderRoutes, takes the URL from the…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48153 Advisory: Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata IDs: CVE-2026-48153, GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48153 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:56 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @budibase/server 3.39.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected < 3.39.0; fixed in 3.39.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq (OSV record GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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