Budibase: Workspace-scoped builder escalates to global admin via /api/public/v1/roles/assign
CVE-2026-48150GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@budibase/server 3.39.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- < 3.39.0
- Fixed in
- 3.39.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.0 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-48150: 0.29% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 21.90 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary /api/public/v1/roles/assign is guarded by the builderOrAdmin middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the x-budibase-app-id header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (builder.apps set but builder.global unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants builder.global=true or admin.global=true on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the EXPANDEDPUBLICAPI feature. Details Controller (packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts:13-17): Nothing filters assignmentProps. The request body's builder and admin keys flow directly into the SDK. SDK (packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts:17-47): No check that the caller already…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48150 Advisory: Budibase: Workspace-scoped builder escalates to global admin via /api/public/v1/roles/assign IDs: CVE-2026-48150, GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48150 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:55 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @budibase/server 3.39.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected < 3.39.0; fixed in 3.39.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh (OSV record GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.39.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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