Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

8.8 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-48050: 0.64% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 50.87 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/ via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication. Impact Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can: - Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543). - Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths. - Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU). - Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile. No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds…

Published by the source

11 Jun 2026, 17:10 UTC

Last modified by the source

11 Jun 2026, 17:10 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48050

Advisory: Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS
IDs: CVE-2026-48050, GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48050 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/basekick-labs/arc 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc: affected < 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949; fixed in 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/basekick-labs/arc.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m lists affected ranges: Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc >=0 <0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949)

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