Go Restful API Boilerplate: Hardcoded JWT Secret "random" Allows Token Forgery
CVE-2026-48031GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/dhax/go-base 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/dhax/go-base >=0 <0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-48031: 0.63% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 50.05 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Vulnerability: CWE-798 — Hardcoded JWT Secret + Broken Mitigation Affected Component - github.com/dhax/go-base — Go REST API boilerplate (go-chi/jwtauth/v5, Viper, PostgreSQL/Bun) - 1,685 stars on GitHub Vulnerability Locations | File | Line | Role | |------|------|------| | dev.env | 10 | AUTHJWTSECRET=random — template default shipped to all users | | cmd/serve.go | 35 | viper.SetDefault("authjwtsecret", "random") — code-level fallback | | auth/jwt/tokenauth.go | 22-25 | Weak mitigation: only checked literal "random", auto-generated non-persistent key | | auth/jwt/tokenauth.go | 28 | jwtauth.New("HS256", []byte(secret), nil) — creates JWT signer with the weak key | | pwdless/api.go | 203 | GenTokenPair() — issues access + refresh tokens signed with the weak key | Data Flow Description The JWT signing secret is hardcoded to the string "random" in two independent locations: 1. dev.env:10 — The template .env file sets AUTHJWTSECRET=random. Every developer who copies this template gets…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48031 Advisory: Go Restful API Boilerplate: Hardcoded JWT Secret "random" Allows Token Forgery IDs: CVE-2026-48031, GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48031 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/dhax/go-base 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/dhax/go-base: affected < 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6; fixed in 0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/dhax/go-base: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/dhax/go-base. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mqq6-462x-jxmm lists affected ranges: Go github.com/dhax/go-base >=0 <0.0.0-20260517152733-cc82b9740fa6) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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