nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

• CVE-2026-48025: 0.51% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 43.30 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64 constructs a CAManager with the plaintext ed25519.PrivateKey after unwrapping via the master key; internal/pki/ca.go:13-16 stores it. Callers at internal/api/enroll.go:116, internal/api/updates.go:297, and internal/api/mobilebundle.go:40 use the manager for one Sign() and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (internal/keystore/keystore.go doc: "Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed") is not met by the CAManager consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. Affected All released versions up to v0.3.6. Threat model Memory-read access: core dump, ptrace, kernel swap to disk, container/VM snapshot, OOM-debug bundle, side-channel via shared cache lines. Not a remote-network vulnerability, but defeats…

Published by the source

10 Jun 2026, 18:34 UTC

Last modified by the source

26 Jun 2026, 20:48 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-48025

Advisory: nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing
IDs: CVE-2026-48025, GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-48025 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/juev/nebula-mesh 0.3.7; github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh 0.3.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/juev/nebula-mesh: affected < 0.3.7; fixed in 0.3.7
- Go github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh: affected < 0.3.7; fixed in 0.3.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/juev/nebula-mesh: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/juev/nebula-mesh, github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v lists affected ranges: Go github.com/juev/nebula-mesh >=0 =0 <0.3.7)

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