Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks
CVE-2026-47735GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/basekick-labs/arc 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc >=0 <0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-47735: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.32 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only readparquet( and arcpartitionagg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — readcsvauto, readcsv, readjson, readjsonauto, readtext, readblob, glob, parquetmetadata, parquetschema, readxlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers. Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via: Confirmed reachable targets: - auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows. - arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys. - /proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets. - Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths. - SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — readcsvauto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-47735 Advisory: Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks IDs: CVE-2026-47735, GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-47735 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/basekick-labs/arc 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc: affected < 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02; fixed in 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/basekick-labs/arc. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/basekick-labs/arc >=0 <0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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