vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise .finally() species bypass
CVE-2026-47210GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (vm2 3.11.4), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm vm2
- Affected
- <= 3.11.3
- Fixed in
- 3.11.4
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q lists affected ranges: npm vm2 >=0 <=3.11.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q lists affected ranges: npm vm2 >=0 <3.11.4 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-47210: 1.72% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 77.45 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats vm2 as a security boundary may be fully compromised. Details On node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through WebAssembly.promising(...) do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises. That path yields a host-originated TypeError during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through .finally(), the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object's…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-47210 Advisory: vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass IDs: CVE-2026-47210, GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-47210 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:55 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: vm2 3.11.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm vm2: affected <= 3.11.3; fixed in 3.11.4 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls vm2 --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on vm2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q lists affected ranges: npm vm2 >=0 <=3.11.3) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q (OSV record GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q lists affected ranges: npm vm2 >=0 <3.11.4 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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