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Medium, CVSS 5.4

Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember can fire other users' cron tasks via AlertRule.FailTriggerTasks (no ownership check)

CVE-2026-47120GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/nezhahq/nezha 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/nezhahq/nezha

    Affected
    >= 1.4.0, < 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97
    Fixed in
    1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-47120: 0.31% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.38 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary createAlertRule and createService (and their update siblings) accept FailTriggerTasks []uint64 and RecoverTriggerTasks []uint64 — IDs of cron tasks to fire when the alert/service trips. The validation function only validates the alert's Rules.Ignore server map; it never checks that the cron task IDs in FailTriggerTasks / RecoverTriggerTasks belong to the caller. When the alert fires, singleton.CronShared.SendTriggerTasks(taskIDs, triggerServer) (service/singleton/crontask.go:113-127) looks up those task IDs in the global cron registry and executes them via CronTrigger. For non-AlertTrigger cover modes, CronTrigger fans the command out to every server in ServerShared.Range with no ownership check. Net effect: a RoleMember can attach their alert rule (or service monitor) to another user's cron task ID — including admin's crons. When the alert trips, the admin's cron command runs across every server (or every server in its allow/deny list). This is the same fanout/auth-bypass…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-47120

Advisory: Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember can fire other users' cron tasks via AlertRule.FailTriggerTasks (no ownership check)
IDs: CVE-2026-47120, GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-47120 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/nezhahq/nezha 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/nezhahq/nezha: affected >= 1.4.0, < 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97; fixed in 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/nezhahq/nezha: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/nezhahq/nezha.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/nezhahq/nezha >=1.4.0 <1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97)

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