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High, CVSS 8.2amended

iskorotkov/avro: Integer Overflow in Decoder

CVE-2026-46384GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/hamba/avro/v2

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • Go github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2

    Affected
    < 2.33.0
    Fixed in
    2.33.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.2 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-46384: 0.55% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 46.03 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder Summary Several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. Exploitation requires only an untrusted Avro stream. No primitives reach beyond…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GO-2026-5047

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-46384

Advisory: iskorotkov/avro: Integer Overflow in Decoder
IDs: CVE-2026-46384, GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-46384 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 2.33.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/hamba/avro/v2: affected every version
- Go github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2: affected < 2.33.0; fixed in 2.33.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/hamba/avro/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/hamba/avro/v2, github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5047 (OSV record GO-2026-5047 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >=0 =0)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv lists affected ranges: Go github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >=0 <2.33.0)

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