Coder: PKCS#7 signature bypass in Azure instance identity allows unauthenticated agent token theft
CVE-2026-46354GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/coder/coder
- Affected
- <= 0.27.3
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Go github.com/coder/coder/v2
- Affected
- >= 2.33.0-rc.0, < 2.33.3>= 2.32.0-rc.0, < 2.32.2>= 2.31.0, < 2.31.12>= 2.30.0, < 2.30.8>= 2.29.0, < 2.29.13< 2.24.5
- Fixed in
- 2.32.2, 2.24.5, 2.31.12, 2.33.3, 2.30.8, 2.29.13
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf lists affected ranges: Go github.com/coder/coder/v2 >=2.33.0-rc.0 =2.32.0-rc.0 =2.31.0 =2.30.0 =2.29.0 =0 =0 <=0.27.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-46354: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.80 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary azureidentity.Validate() verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. {"vmId":"<target"} and the forged vmId will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent's session token. No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM's vmId which is a UUIDv4. that's a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited Root Cause In unpatched Coder releases the signature over the PKCS#7 content is not validated - only the signing certificate is checked. Impact An attacker on any Azure VM or with access to a publicly available Azure IMDS certificate from CT logs can: 1. Steal an agent session token by sending a forged PKCS#7 envelope to POST /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identity which is unauthenticated. 2. With the stolen token access: - Git SSH private key…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-46354 Advisory: Coder: PKCS#7 signature bypass in Azure instance identity allows unauthenticated agent token theft IDs: CVE-2026-46354, GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-46354 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/coder/coder/v2 2.33.3, 2.32.2, 2.31.12, 2.30.8, 2.29.13, 2.24.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/coder/coder: affected <= 0.27.3 - Go github.com/coder/coder/v2: affected >= 2.33.0-rc.0, < 2.33.3; >= 2.32.0-rc.0, < 2.32.2; >= 2.31.0, < 2.31.12; >= 2.30.0, < 2.30.8; >= 2.29.0, < 2.29.13; < 2.24.5; fixed in 2.32.2, 2.24.5, 2.31.12, 2.33.3, 2.30.8, 2.29.13 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/coder/coder: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/coder/coder/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/coder/coder, github.com/coder/coder/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf lists affected ranges: Go github.com/coder/coder/v2 >=2.33.0-rc.0 =2.32.0-rc.0 =2.31.0 =2.30.0 =2.29.0 =0 =0 <=0.27.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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