Arcane Backend: OS Command Injection in Volume Browser ListDirectory via path query parameter

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-45626: 0.21% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 11.30 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body. Details The execution flow is: 1. BrowseDirectoryInput.Path (query: path) — backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:148 2. VolumeHandler.BrowseDirectory calls volumeService.ListDirectory(ctx, volumeName, input.Path) — backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:858-865. Note the route registration at line 412–419 only declares BearerAuth/ApiKeyAuth; there is no checkAdmin(ctx) call (compare with customize.go, system.go, swarm.go,…

Published by the source

18 May 2026, 13:59 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Jun 2026, 10:30 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-45626

Advisory: Arcane Backend: OS Command Injection in Volume Browser ListDirectory via path query parameter
IDs: CVE-2026-45626, GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-45626 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend: affected <= 1.18.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend >=0 <=1.18.1)

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