Budibase: SSRF in AI Extract File Automation Step via Missing IP Blacklist Validation
CVE-2026-45548GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@budibase/server 3.34.8), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- < 3.34.8
- Fixed in
- 3.34.8
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.34.8 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.34.8
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-45548: 0.26% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 17.49 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Vulnerability Details CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) The processUrlFile function in packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts uses fetch(fileUrl) directly without the IP blacklist validation that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses. Vulnerable Code packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts (lines 116, 139): Contrast with All Other Automation Steps (Same Codebase) Every other automation step that makes outbound HTTP requests properly uses fetchWithBlacklist: - steps/slack.ts:19: response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...}) - steps/discord.ts:28: response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...}) - steps/zapier.ts:33: response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...}) - steps/n8n.ts:53: response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, request) - steps/outgoingWebhook.ts: response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...}) - steps/make.ts: response = await…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-45548 Advisory: Budibase: SSRF in AI Extract File Automation Step via Missing IP Blacklist Validation IDs: CVE-2026-45548, GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-45548 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:53 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.7) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @budibase/server 3.34.8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected < 3.34.8; fixed in 3.34.8 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf (OSV record GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.34.8 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.34.8) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…