Decidim: JWT-backed authentication can be replayed across organizations

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-45414: 0.45% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 39.46 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Description A JWT issued to an Org 1 account is accepted on the Org 2 API and can read the admin-only GraphQL participantDetails field for an Org 2 participant. The same trust-boundary problem also affects API-user authentication: an Org 1 API user can use a JWT on the Org 1 host and replay that JWT to the Org 2 API to read Org 2 participant personal data and reach Org 2's proposal.answer mutation path. Technical description The current host selects the Decidim organization context, but JWT-backed API authentication is not sufficiently bound to that host organization. As a result, the API can process a request in Org 2's context while still trusting an authenticated principal from Org 1. Reproduction steps: 1. Use an API key provided by the system administrator that is assigned to organization 1 to create the JWT token or get the JWT token shown in the response when logged in as the organization admin. <img width="1080" height="1119" alt="decidim-jwt-01"…

Published by the source

13 Jul 2026, 17:16 UTC

Last modified by the source

13 Jul 2026, 17:16 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-45414

Advisory: Decidim: JWT-backed authentication can be replayed across organizations
IDs: CVE-2026-45414, GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-45414 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: decidim 0.32.0, 0.31.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- RubyGems decidim: affected < 0.31.5; >= 0.32.0.rc1, < 0.32.0; fixed in 0.31.5, 0.32.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- RubyGems decidim: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on decidim.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q lists affected ranges: RubyGems decidim >=0 =0.32.0.rc1 <0.32.0)

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