Automad has Broken Access Control: Unauthenticated exposure of administrator bcrypt password hashes and TOTP secrets via public API endpoint

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-45332: 1.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 72.81 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A Broken Access Control vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve the bcrypt password hash of every administrator account with a single POST request. The /api/user-collection/create-first-user setup endpoint remains publicly accessible once initial configuration is complete and returns full serialized user data in the JSON response body. Details Affected version: - bcrypt hash exposure: = 2.0.0-alpha.1, <= 2.0.0-beta.27 - TOTP secret exposure: only 2.0.0-beta.27 Impact Any Automad installation reachable over HTTP is at risk no prior account, credentials, or special network position are required to exploit this vulnerability. Potential impacts include: - Credential hash exposure enabling offline brute-force or dictionary attacks: bcrypt password hashes for every administrator are returned in a single unauthenticated response. While hashes are not plaintext passwords, the salt embedded in the hash is not secret it is visible in the response. Administrators…

Published by the source

27 May 2026, 21:32 UTC

Last modified by the source

8 Jun 2026, 23:54 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:48 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-xm76-r88j-vm3g

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-45332

Advisory: Automad has Broken Access Control: Unauthenticated exposure of administrator bcrypt password hashes and TOTP secrets via public API endpoint
IDs: CVE-2026-45332, GHSA-xm76-r88j-vm3g
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-45332 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:48 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: automad/automad 2.0.0-beta.28. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist automad/automad: affected >= 2.0.0-alpha.1, <= 2.0.0-beta.27; fixed in 2.0.0-beta.28

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist automad/automad: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on automad/automad.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xm76-r88j-vm3g (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xm76-r88j-vm3g lists affected ranges: Packagist automad/automad >=2.0.0-alpha.1 <=2.0.0-beta.27)

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