Netty has Unbounded Direct Memory Consumption in its RedisDecoder
CVE-2026-44890GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (io.netty:netty-codec-redis 4.2.15.Final, 4.1.135.Final), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis
- Affected
- >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final<= 4.1.134.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.2.15.Final, 4.1.135.Final
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3 lists affected ranges: Maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis >=4.2.0.Final =0 <=4.1.134.Final
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-44890: 0.46% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 39.99 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary An attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without \r\n. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed. Details io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisDecoder decodes the length of bulk strings and array headers using the decodeLength method. This method reads bytes from the network until it encounters a \n character. However, it does not enforce any maximum length check while buffering the bytes if the \n character is not found. An attacker can exploit this by sending a continuous stream of digits (e.g., $1111...) without ever sending a \n. To cause a true Denial of Service, an attacker must open multiple concurrent connections and distribute the unbounded payloads among them. According to the RESP specification (https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/reference/protocol-spec/), all parts of the protocol are strictly terminated with \r\n. Furthermore, the…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44890 Advisory: Netty has Unbounded Direct Memory Consumption in its RedisDecoder IDs: CVE-2026-44890, GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44890 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:46 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: io.netty:netty-codec-redis 4.2.15.Final, 4.1.135.Final. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis: affected >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final; <= 4.1.134.Final; fixed in 4.2.15.Final, 4.1.135.Final ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on io.netty:netty-codec-redis. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3 lists affected ranges: Maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis >=4.2.0.Final =0 <=4.1.134.Final) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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