Portainer has a bind-mount restriction bypass via HostConfig.Mounts

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-44850: 0.23% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 14.40 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Portainer offers an environment-level Disable bind mounts for non-administrators security setting that blocks regular users from binding host paths into containers they create through the Portainer-mediated Docker API. The check that enforces this setting only inspected the legacy HostConfig.Binds array on the container-create proxy and never looked at the equivalent HostConfig.Mounts array. Any authenticated user with rights to create containers on a Docker environment where the restriction is enabled could submit a bind-typed entry under HostConfig.Mounts and mount any host path into their container. The two fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon — both produce real bind mounts at runtime — so a check that inspects only one is functionally equivalent to no check at all. The same primitive is correctly enforced on Swarm service create against TaskTemplate.ContainerSpec.Mounts; the gap was specific to the POST /containers/create proxy path. Exploitation requires a…

Published by the source

14 May 2026, 16:23 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Jun 2026, 10:25 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44850

Advisory: Portainer has a bind-mount restriction bypass via HostConfig.Mounts
IDs: CVE-2026-44850, GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44850 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/portainer/portainer 2.41.0, 2.39.2, 2.33.8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/portainer/portainer: affected >= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8; >= 2.39.0, < 2.39.2; >= 2.40.0, < 2.41.0; fixed in 2.39.2, 2.33.8, 2.41.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/portainer/portainer: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/portainer/portainer.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc lists affected ranges: Go github.com/portainer/portainer >=2.33.0 =2.39.0 =2.40.0 <2.41.0)

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